What makes a car a real car as distinct from the perception of one is the matter. That's why the car in Sally's seeing has no weight, and why you cannot sit in it or drive it away.
There are straws in the wind, even in 1874, that Brentano might move towards a more commonsense and realistic conception. And so he did, later. But he did so crabwise. At some points he believed we might have a non-existing car or state of affairs of the car needing repair as our object, and later still he considered that in the case of mistaken or illusory acts we have no actual object at all, it is just that we talk about it as if we do. Such are the gyrations through which Brentano's conception of intentionality makes its way as he tortuously revises his views. The ideas of 1874 and thereafter variously influence his students, notably Husserl, who (initially) takes a much more sane and commonsensical view, as we shall see.
Brentano was never very interested in language and meaning as such, so we should not expect much from him in the way of an account. (His student Anton Marty did, but that is a different and long story.) But to the extent that we can readily graft an account of linguistic meaning onto his early philosophy, it would tend to be of the private sort that Dummett rightly finds wanting. When Sally tells Wolfgang the car needs repairing, the meaning of her utterance, what she is talking about, is the complex of phenomena she has in mind when she judges that her car needs repairing.
When Wolfgang understands her aright, it is because his thoughts have suitably matched hers. Here of course is the nub of the problem. It is not just that no-one can be sure his or her thoughts match Sally's in the right way, so that the success or otherwise of the communication remains uncertain: it is that it is unclear how Sally herself can mean what she does by the words she utters and be certain that the words correctly convey the content of her thought. This is, or is at least closely related to, Wittgenstein's problem of a private language.
Incidentally, though this is not our primary concern, Brentano's late reistic philosophy is much more akin to later analytic philosophy than his earlier work. where it serves to define ratios between quantities in such a way as to accommodate irrationals. Its use there is more complex and subtle than in Frege: whereas Frege was simply trying to give a retro-fitted foundation for uncontroversial simple arithmetic, Euclid (following Eudoxus) was breaking new ground and overcoming the problem of incommensurables.
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Frege's account of meaning eventually settled down from 1890 into the theory of sense and reference with which every philosophy student is now familiar. The remarkable geniality and systematic working-out of this theory is why Frege is revered as a philosopher of language, although the distinction plays hardly any role in his logical systems. The theory as held by Frege is platonistic. The senses of expressions, including notably the senses of complete sentential clauses, which are his Gedanken, or as I shall say, propositions, are denizens of a "third realm" (Frege's retrospectively unfortunate term was ein drittes Reich) and therefore neither part of the subjective but temporal order of the mental nor part of the objective spatiotemporal-causal order of the physical world. We have access to these senses in virtue of a thoroughly mysterious relation Frege calls "grasping" (erfassen). When Sally says "My car needs repairing" and Wolfgang understands her, they do so by each grasping the same thought, or thoughts which are close enough to have the same import for everyday speech. But how they do so is at least as mysterious as how their subjective thought contents might be relevantly alike according to the Brentanian account. There is apparently nothing to stop Sally and/or Wolfgang grasping the wrong proposition, say that Sally's roses need watering, and either understanding one another perfectly because they both grasp the very same wrong proposition, or misunderstand one another by grasping different propositions, but this somehow failing to make any difference to their worldly communion. Dummett recognises this difficulty, and it is why he repeatedly castigates what he calls Frege's "myth of the third realm". The platonism as such may or may not be an issue -one could mayhap be a platonist about other things such as properties or mathematical objects -it is the consequence that the realm-crossing relation of grasping is impotent to explain how real-life successful communication takes place that makes the theory useless in accounting for meaning. It is from this Wittgensteinian perspective that Dummett is happy to repudiate both psychological and platonistic accounts, both Brentano and Frege. It is also on this basis that a light-touch account of meanings as abstractions can be developed.
Dummett envisages a basis of concrete uses of language by particular speakers at particular times making particular noises, gestures and other signs to particular audiences and in particular circumstances. Across this basis, into which we are born and inducted and to which we conform, we are able by discerning similarities that can be taken as equivalence relations (or something close enough to them for our purposes) thence to talk about abstract words, sentences, their meanings, and all the other items that linguists investigate. There is surely nothing wrong with this, and as an ontological nominalist I cannot envisage any other basis with which I could rest content.
All the same, once the salutory negative lessons have been extracted from Wittgenstein, and the richness of his range of examples digested, there remains a deeply unsatisfying lack of system to Wittgenstein's own work, indeed a deliberate eschewal of system, which is why linguists and philosophers of language -those who have not simply aped the master -have gone beyond and tried to build theories.
Dummett is just such a person. While I have neither the space, the inclination or indeed the competence to enter into any detail about Dummett's quest for a theory of meaning and what it should or should not involve, I will register two points on which I think Dummett failed, because of the influence of the Wittgensteinian perspective, to do sufficient justice to one of the Austrians he named, namely Husserl, and two he did not, namely Marty and Bühler.
In Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, the mental component so stressed by Husserl drops out completely. It has no role, because it is impotent to make meaning objective as Wittgenstein (and everyone else, except perhaps Brouwer and other solipsists) rightly desires. But Brentano, Husserl and others were perfectly right to maintain that there is an essential mental component to language in use. Without mental acts of perception, judgement and so on, noises would be meaningless. Husserl was right on that. Where he was wrong, and Wittgenstein was right, was to think that the mental side is what gives expressions meaning, makes them meaningful. Wrong: it is their use in societal communication that does that. But such communication can only obtain because we language users are beings with a rich panoply of mental capacities. Otherwise it might as well be zombies or robots "talking" to each other.
We don't think that when internet servers link up and pass information back and forth that this is language with meaning: if something meaningful is being passed along, this meaning got there in the first place through human end-users. Whatever roles the mental plays -and that is a long, disputed and incomplete story -it cannot be ignored, which is one good reason why cognitive science flourishes. 
